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First, thanks very much to Ivan Welty for organizing this symposium.  I was glad to see the 
phrase "Picture Theory" put in quotes in the title of the symposium, because I am not aware of 
Wittgenstein ever having used this exact phrase.  What I do know is this:  there is a point in time 
before which Wittgenstein does not use the word often translated as 'picture' (Bild) in connection 
with a proposition;  but, after that point, the word and its cognates appear frequently in his 
writings; not only his writings in the weeks immediately afterwards, but [translations of]1 many 
works written even decades later feature 'picture' as both a verb [abbilden, tr. as depict] and a 
noun [bild, tr. as picture].   
 
That point in time is recorded in the notebooks he kept while serving in the military, so we know 
the date (September 29, 1914), and we know what he said it was that occasioned the insight he 
regarded as so crucial.  We know this not only from the notebook entry itself, but from the fact 
that he recounted his memory of the occasion of having the insight to several friends, multiple 
times.  What occasioned it, he said, was reading about the use of physical miniatures -- a 
miniature model -- to portray a traffic accident in a courtroom.  The reference in the notebooks is 
actually very unassuming; placed inside parentheses after "In the proposition a world is as it were 
put together experimentally" [Im Satz wird eine Welt probeweise zusammengestellt.]  is "As when 
in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident [automobilungluck] is represented by means of dolls 
[puppen], etc." 
 
As for the use of the word 'picture' rather than 'model' in the term "Picture" Theory,  David Stern 
explains: "Wittgenstein used the word "Bild" to talk about the model, a term usually translated as 
'picture'; [. . .]  While both words cover such things as images, film frames, drawings, and 
paintings, the idea of a three-dimensional model is more readily conveyed by the German "Bild" 
than the English "picture."   However, I would add to Stern's comments that we do see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In this prepared text of my talk, I used brackets around text that I probably will not read when 
the paper is read aloud, for smoothness of presentation, but which is helpful to have in the ms. to 
note a qualification or avoid an ambiguity.  
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Wittgenstein use the word model, too, notably, to relate Bild and Model, in T 2.12 "A picture [Bild] 
is a model [Modell] of reality."  [Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.] 
 
My view on the role of this event, as I explain in my book [1], is that intellectually the moment was 
more a recognition of something he had been looking for rather than a conversion.  I.e., that the 
ideas had already been developing.   When he had an insight that locked on to the magazine 
article's description of a miniature setup used in a law-court  and served up to him what he 
needed to formulate his thoughts about the proposition-as-a-picture" and picture-as-a-model , it 
was more like the recognition a sculptor has in lighting on an appropriate item to use as a found 
object in an artwork already partially envisioned.  ( [1], p. 251-252) 
 
To reach this view, I looked at other elements of Wittgenstein's milieu to provide the context in 
which Wittgenstein viewed the magazine article about "representing by means of dolls", in 
particular a landmark paper in a physics journal relevant to using physical scale models to 
represent things on a larger scale, entitled "Physically Similar Systems" and dated July 1914.  It 
was by the physicist Edgar Buckingham, a National Bureau of Standards researcher recruited to 
serve on an advisory committee on Aeronautics, and seems to be a short communication from 
the Washington [DC] Academy of Sciences; reading the literature of that era, it is clear that news 
about technology and, especially, about aeroplane technology in 1914, was eagerly and urgently 
exchanged across borders and oceans -- remember, there was basically a "Victorian Internet" 
then -- a transatlantic cable and an extensive network of electronic telegraph communications.  I 
also provided the historical context to another analogy Wittgenstein uses in the Tractatus to 
explain how a proposition depicts:  gramophone records.  Illustrating with figures, I showed how 
both the accounts in the Tractatus --- (i) of the proposition as a picture, and (ii) of gramophone 
records and a symphony score having the same logical form --- underwent development during 
the war.  Just glancing cursorily at the figures, you can see that in the figures I sketched to portray 
these two views in the Tractatus [of the proposition as a picture and of the gramophone record 
and symphony score having the same logical form] (Figure 1B and Figure 4, respectively), both 
have a triangular shape , whereas the sketches that portray the pre-war views do not.  
 
The development is illustrated in a series of figures (reproduced from the book in the 
appendix/handout to this talk), as follows:   
 
-- Prior to mid-1914, Wittgenstein would have had experiences with the fairly new technology of 
producing music from the grooves of a gramophone record, and, due to the family he grew up in, 
was party to many critical conversations about the nuances of producing music from musical 
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scores via musicians' performances (whether by playing an instrument, or by voice/whistling).  
This is shown on Figure 1A on the handout [which is from my book]: basically, it shows that a 
properly trained musician can produce a symphony from the score (written in musical notation); 
some musicians can also produce a musical score from hearing a symphony.  And, that a 
gramophone machine enables one to produce a symphony from the lines on a gramophone 
record.  It is interesting that the technology of recording sound in lines was developed years 
before this -- the phonautograph, which produced records that were valued as two-dimensional 
visual records of sound, without any interest in their value as means of producing/reproducing 
sound; schoolchildren read in their textbooks how a  phonautograph could produce these visual 
records.  Thus I take Wittgenstein to be knowledgeable of both phonautographs and 
gramophones, and that the mention of the gramophone refers to the process of producing sound 
from the lines on the gramophone record.    
 
-- Also, prior to mid-1914, in the pre-war Notes on Logic, Wittgenstein had worked out a view 
about the relationships between propositions, signs, and symbols.   The pre-war view is shown on 
Figures 2A and 2B (from my book, also reproduced on the handout.)  So, he already had that 
much, well before the insight in Autumn 1914:  i.e., he had already said that [reading from the 
handout, figures 2A and 2B] the correspondence between a propositional symbol and reality 
depends on the simples that the symbol contains, and "that a certain thing is the case in the 
symbol says that a certain thing is the case in the world."   He had written, regarding propositional 
signs, that "if an x stands in the relation R to a y the sign 'xRy' is to be called true to the facts and 
otherwise false."   He had  written, regarding the human skill of understanding propositional signs, 
that "I understand the form 'xRy' when I know that it discriminates the behavior of x and y 
according as these stand in the relation of R or not."   And, regarding propositional truth functions:  
"In two molecular functions that have the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the 
same.") 
 
So he already had that much;  what happens after the crucial insight in Autumn of 1914 gets 
developed?   
 
One striking thing is that Wittgenstein focuses on pairs of seemingly dissimilar representations:  
"At first sight a proposition -- one set out on the printed page, for example -- does not seem to be 
a picture of the reality with which it is concerned.  But neither do written notes seem at first sight 
to be a picture of a piece of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our 
speech.'"  (4.011)   Now, notice:  He does not appeal to examples in which similarity is based on 
visual or geometrical similarity.  That's very important.   It is often missed.   
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--- In the Tractatus, as depicted in Figure 1B, the account of how the lines on the gramophone 
record,  and the musical notation of the symphony score, which Wittgenstein describes as two 
things which "appear to be very different at first",  are shown to "have the same logical form."   His 
account of having the same logical form involves processes that result in some graphical product 
or musical performance:  the musician's abilities in being able to "obtain the symphony from the 
score" and the ability to employ a process that likewise yields the symphony from the lines on a 
gramophone record.  This is what having the same logical form amounts to:  translatability, 
though by no means a direct correspondence between points on the gramophone lines and notes 
in the symphony score.2  It's worth emphasizing here again that Wittgenstein did not appeal to the 
geometric characteristics of the lines on the gramophone record, even though, in his day, the 
patterns that the lines that a musical performance recorded on a gramophone disc or roll made 
were often appreciated as two-dimensional drawings (such as magnified traces of wavy lines 
made by a phonautograph needle used to record voices and other sounds, or, in physics, Mach's 
famous schlieren photographs capturing shock waves visually, which were widely reproduced 
and had become part of popular and artistic culture.)  The gramophone example is used to make 
a point about propositions:  "A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the 
sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds 
between language and the world."  [T 4.014]  What they all have in common, though, he says is 
"logical structure" [Ogden translation]  
 
If geometric or visual similarity is not what Wittgenstein appeals to in explaining that the musical 
score and the lines on a gramophone record have the same logical form, what does he appeal 
to?  intertranslatability via serial processes.  The processes he appeals to include ones that 
involve skill, training, and conventions about notation,  as well as some mechanical processes. 
This is, I think, a very important thing to notice.  It does not mean that those spatial relations or 
visual similarity do not play some role in the processes of translation, but the account of logical 
form is not in terms of, and certainly not reducible to, them.  Here I suspect Wittgenstein is 
following Frege in thinking that it is the notion of translation, rather than the notion of 
interpretation, that is relevant in understanding logical form.  In his criticisms of formalism in 
mathematics, Frege argued against the use of uninterpreted formulae in mathematics and logic.  
[2]  (We are not always careful in distinguishing the terms; for Frege, translation is from one 
meaningful entity to another; interpretation, as the formalists meant it, was from one uninterpreted 
statement to an interpreted one.)   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  There are a number of other relevant points associated with Figure 1B discussed in "Pictures of 
Sounds: Wittgenstein on Gramophone Records and the Logic of Depiction" 	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How is the account of logical form that appears in the discussion of the gramophone in the 
Tractatus related to the experience of reading about a miniature setup used in a courtroom to 
portray something about a traffic accident?  
 
It would be nice to know a little more about how the miniature setup was discussed in the 
magazine; what kind of evidence was the miniature setup supposed to provide?  The setting was 
a law-court, not a scientific laboratory or even a forensic one.  The miniature automobiles involved 
in the setup are often referred to as "toys" by commentators on Wittgenstein, though I am not 
aware that Wittgenstein ever did so in his Notebooks.    
 
The miniature cars involved may well have been merely toys, but it is also true that in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, scale models that were serious affairs and scaled to be 
used as experimental models for particular scientific research or forensic investigative purposes 
were often called toys, too.  Modelmaking combined art and science; by 1914 there were 
modelmaker hobby clubs and "modelmaker" was a skilled profession.  Even rigorously scaled 
models were sometimes made to be aesthetically pleasing as well as being precision pieces of 
machinery.  Modelmakers of such charming models were known to protest that calling their 
productions toys failed to do justice to the craftsmanship, knowledge, and precision required in 
order to produce properly scaled behaviors.  Different materials had to be used to provide 
appropriately scaled densities and flexibilities; surfaces had to be modified to give appropriately 
scaled mechanical behaviors.   So I think one point to keep in mind is that someone with 
Wittgenstein's knowledge and interests in aeronautical engineering, in which precision scale 
models were absolutely essential, could hardly suppress knowledge of the logical and 
mathematical basis for using scale models in physics, when viewing such a miniature setup.   
 
There are some cultural and ethical aspects to the significance of such a court case around 1914, 
too.   
 
First, the issues of the burden of proof for proving fault in automobile accidents, and whether 
injury and death caused by automobile accidents should be covered under criminal law or not, 
were still undergoing change and clarification.  There were even questions of ethics involved as to 
what kinds of considerations were relevant in applying the existing legal doctrines to the situation 
of automobile accidents. [3]  [e.g., consideration of risk-spreading;  role of ownership, role of 
vehicle being under one's control, role of negligence]  This might be something to keep in mind 
with respect to Wittgenstein's later remark that the most important point of the Tractatus was an 
ethical one -- what it did not say.  
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Secondly, it is also significant that, in 1914, an important revolution in the use of physical 
evidence in court cases that would set the agenda for methods used in forensic investigation to 
this day, was just beginning.  The Frenchman Edmond Locard, a protege of Bertillion who 
claimed to have used the fictional Sherlock Holmes as his inspiration and guide, had just been 
given a laboratory in Lyon (France) in 1912 in rooms attached to the courthouse, for such 
scientific investigations.   The question of what kind of physical evidence could be admitted, and 
what it could be used to prove, was of interest to the public, as it hadn't really been settled yet.  
Other laboratories were established based on Locard's methods:  first in 1914, there was one in 
Quebec [4] ;  many others followed.   Locard is known best for the methods he developed and 
disseminated using the microscope for making minute distinctions, such as between many 
different kinds of dust particles and, following his teacher Bertillion, for the use of various 
biometrics for all sorts of imprints a person might leave behind. [7]  However, Locard was also 
very much interested in collisions; in his laboratory in Lyon he worked on detecting cause and 
fault in automobile collisions:  what did the evidence left behind from an automobile collision, such 
as skid marks left by tires, tell people about the collision that had taken place?   This is a matter 
of reading the collision from the skid marks, but in a courtroom, one would also want to show how 
the skid marks could have been created by a certain sequence of events that was the fault of one 
of the drivers.  Could one and the same model have served both to illustrate something such as 
who had the right of way and also to prove that skid marks (lines) left on the road could be 
translated into a certain sequence of events? 
 
Spurred by such questions, I have spent an inordinate amount of time scouring period magazines 
for an account of models used in a courtroom such as Wittgenstein described.  And, so far, I have 
found one:  it appeared in June 1914, and, though the article is in English, the sketch illustrating 
the account is from a French magazine.  It may or may not be the magazine Wittgenstein meant, 
but it is contemporaneous, so, at any rate, the account is of interest, as reflecting the 
understanding of how models could serve as evidence in a courtroom setting at that time.   
 
The magazine article I found shows a personal-injury lawyer seated at a table on which a large 
clean white piece of paper covering the entire tabletop has been lain; the outlines of the roads 
leading into an intersection are sketched on the paper.  Five "miniature" vehicles are on the table; 
although referred to as 'miniatures' in the article, they are large miniatures: most of the 
automobiles must be at least the size of a breadbox, it appears to me, and they look quite 
detailed.  There are several doll occupants in the vehicles, and they seem arranged with care, in 
different postures;  some are unprotected, their vehicles being open like a convertible.  One three 
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wheeled vehicle is toppled.   The account says that the lawyer is "studying a case to place the 
responsibility for the accident" and to get "a clear idea of the different phases" of it.  We are told 
that he acts out "the whole occurrence" so that "the questions of right of way, traffic regulations, 
rules of the road, and such matters" are made clear.  The lawyer also uses the model to 
communicate:  "Thus equipped, he is able to place his case lucidly before the court."  [13]  This 
account seems to fit with Wittgenstein's mention of dolls (puppen); it is the injury to the humans 
that is of most importance to the personal injury lawyer.  This account also fits well with von 
Wright's description that "At the trial a miniature model of the accident was presented before the 
court.  The model here served as a proposition; that is, as a possible state of affairs."  ([8], p. 21) 
 
One striking (to me3) thing is the context of this "found object" (the model of a traffic accident):  a 
court of law.  Much of what the lawyer wants to present using the model involves conventions 
and, especially, violations of "traffic regulations" and "rules of the road."   The physical aspects of 
the model are surely part of judging whether there have been violations, as well as in determining 
the sequence of events that led to an injury, and to how the injury was caused.  But whether there 
have been traffic violations, and who had the right of way, involves rules and conventions as well.  
In the Notebooks, in following up on his thoughts about a proposition as a picture, Wittgenstein 
remarks that a picture might be used to portray how not to fence.  ([9] NB 5 November 1914 
entry) The model might be used to portray a violation of a traffic rule, or it might be used to 
portray a state of affairs that did not occur, say, in showing negligence, to show what would have 
happened (a possible state of affairs) had a driver acted otherwise than he or she did.  
 
Another striking thing in the account of the model of a traffic accident in this magazine article is 
the mention of the dynamics of the model:  "the different phases"; "the whole occurrence", which 
draws attention to the miniature model of the traffic accident as a dynamic model.  There is, after 
all, a vehicle that has been overturned, and one that is in the process of turning a corner.  
Certainly the way the lawyer is using the model is, at first, investigatively, or experimentally, to 
examine the situation and the possible ways it might have developed to yield the outcomes 
known to have occurred, and the possible ways it could, counterfactually, have developed.   
 
As I explained in my book, what I see in the Tractatus is an account of how propositional sign, 
truth function, and world are related that looks very much, even in details, like an analogue of the 
account of using model experiments --- e.g., ships, aeroplanes, propellers --- to represent actual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I mentioned it at the end of Sterrett (2000) "Physical Pictures:  Engineering models circa 1914 
and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus; long version at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/661/1/Sterrett-UNC-
CH-PPTalk2.pdf  As for the content of the talk, the content Sterrett 2005/6 [1] supersedes that 
talk.).	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or imagined ships, aeroplanes, and propellers circa mid-1914.  Actually, the methodology used -- 
physically similar systems -- is very general.  The quote from Hertz' preface that the form we give 
our images in thought is such that "the necessary consequents of the images in thought are 
always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured"4 is often cited in 
connection with Wittgenstein's Tractatus, but I do not think Hertz meant to be saying anything 
novel with that statement in the preface; statements to that effect are quite common in nineteenth 
century physics.  The idea that one can formulate a picture or model -- a concrete physical setup 
as well as an imagined or mathematical one -- and set up a correspondence between them such 
that the consequents of manipulating quantities in the model that correspond to the thing modeled 
are the corresponding consequents in the thing modeled was also quite common.  When it was 
an equation rather than a physical model, and the consequent a matter of mathematical 
deduction, Hertz' statement would fit.  The use of dimensionless parameters as a criterion for this 
kind of similarity between two physical systems  -- i.e., similarity of systems S and S' (which is the 
terminology used to describe the relationship between a model being tested experimentally and 
the thing it modeled) exists when the relevant dimensionless ratios formed from the 
corresponding quantities in the two systems are equal -- was also developed in physics in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  What I often found, though, was that mathematicians, 
physicists or engineers writing about similar systems and similarity would often comment that the 
methods were not well enough known, that they were powerful and elegant and that there was 
much to be gained by adopting them. [10]    
 
What happened in July1914, with the "Physically Similar Systems" paper was significant, though, 
in that the method was generalized so that it no longer involved deriving the required criteria from 
an equation that described the phenomenon. Rather, similarity criteria (the dimensionless ratios 
that must have the same value in each of the two systems (model and thing modeled)) could be 
derived from the "most general form" of a physical equation, which contained no arithmetical 
constants.  The most general form of a physical equation was written using the notation of 
functions.  This often sounds not really possible; where does the information come from, if not 
from an equation of physics such as a partial differential equation?  The reason it is possible is 
due to what is built into the system of measurement.  It is the July 1914 formulation of similarity 
between physically similar systems as a methodology of using model experiments, that I use to 
draw the analogy shown in Figures 3 and 4, between experimental models and propositions in 
the Tractatus, respectively.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Quoted in David G. Stern's Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, p 37, from Heinrich Hertz:  The 
Principles of Mechanics, Tr. by D. E. Jones and J. T. Walley.  (Dover, New York  1956) [11] 
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I am not going to lay that analogy out again in this talk; it is given in my book.  I'd like to point out, 
though, some of the historical and biographical details supporting this suggestion.  Here are just a 
few such details:  Most saliently, the topic of similarity in science and engineering was prominent 
in the years immediately preceding 1914, and the paper "Physically Similar Systems" came out 
when Wittgenstein was already back from Norway, and staying in Vienna, where access to 
scientific news and literature was excellent.  A timeline (from a forthcoming paper "Physically 
Similar Systems: a history of the concept" [10] ) reproduced on the handout shows the intensity of 
publications related to similarity throughout 1914.  I cite lots of other supporting details in the 
book.  Another one quite close in time to the 1914 insight was that the use of mechanical 
similarity was cited in a Nobel Prize Lecture given in December 1913 that received wide coverage 
in the Press, including cartoon caricatures of the Nobel Laureate, Heike Kamerlingh Onnes, as 
"Dr Zero" in newspapers and magazines [the Prize was for achieving the liquefication of helium].  
Wittgenstein was in Vienna during that time period, too; even though he had been in Norway in 
1913, he came back to his family home in Vienna for Christmas of 1913.  Onnes had helped 
derive a more general "theory of corresponding states" in physical chemistry than van der Waals' 
initial version, and cited Newton's theory of mechanical similarity with awe.  Wittgenstein could 
hardly have missed the association of Onnes' work with model experiments, as Newton and, to 
some extent, Galileo, were often cited in the scientific and engineering literature on using 
experimental models as the first to use and write about similitude.  With regard to the homage to 
Newton, I also note in my book [1] the significance of the recently discovered fact that 
Wittgenstein purchased exactly the two works by Newton and Galileo that were cited in the 
literature on dynamic similarity and similar systems.  These purchases don't seem to be easily 
explained by any other interest -- the work by Galileo was extremely rare and expensive, and it 
seems to be the only work by Galileo Wittgenstein owned.      
 
These historical and biographical facts are merely supportive, though:  my main reason for 
thinking that the methodology of physically similar systems, which by the time of Wittgenstein's 
reading of the magazine article in September 1914 had already been presented in the short 
communication "Physically Similar Systems"  in July,  is in fact the analogy between the account 
of how models portray in it, and the account of a proposition given in the Tractatus.  In particular, 
the "no logical constants" principle that Wittgenstein referred to as the Grundgedanke of the 
Tractatus has a clear analogue in the account [equations in science that contain arithmetical 
symbols are replaced by ones that do not contain any such connectives, by employing functional 
notation].  Most significantly, the analogy yields an account of objects that I find aligns perfectly 
with the statements in the Tractatus about objects and facts composed of objects, sans logical 
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constants.   This part of the analogy is shown on the handwritten handout to my talk at HOPOS 
2000 (and is reproduced in the appendix to this manuscript of the talk).  [Reading from Handout:  
Whereas the methodology of experimental models speaks of the "most general form of a physical 
equation" as containing no algebraic constants, Wittgenstein writes of the "general form of a 
proposition" containing no logical constants.  Whereas, in the dimensional equations used in 
Buckingham's July 1914 "Physically Similar Systems" paper, dimensions or quantities combine in 
only certain ways to form dimensionless parameters, in the Tractatus we are told that objects 
combine in only certain ways to form states of affairs."   I see the way objects function as 
completely analogous to the way that dimensions do.  
 
One thing that is not shown on the figures in my book is how the elements in the model 
correspond to the elements in reality.  This is very straightforward, although implicit:  since the 
similarity of the two systems is a matter of certain key dimensionless parameters (ratios) having 
the same value in the model as in the thing modeled, one can simply show the correlation 
between model and thing modelled from those ratios alone.  To take an easy case, consider 
Mach number, a degenerate case of a dimensionless parameter:  (velocity of a moving body v)/ 
(velocity of sound in the fluid at the fluid conditions that obtain vs).   Suppose we have a case in 
which similarity is established by the Mach number being the same in the model as in the thing 
modelled (again, a degenerate case).  Then, letting v depict the velocity in S and V depict the 
velocity in S', we can say that   v/vs = V/Vs   We can then say that the velocity v corresponds to 
the velocity V vs/Vs; this gives the model its "feelers", which shows exactly how the velocity in the 
model corresponds to the velocity in the thing modeled.  Measuring one of these two velocities 
can be used to tell us what the other, corresponding, velocity is.   With this in mind, we can make 
good sense of the following statements in the Tractatus [5]:  
 
2.1511  That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.  
2.1512  It is laid against reality like a measure.   
2.15121  Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be 
measured.   
2.1513 So a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which 
makes it into a picture.   
2.1514  The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with 
things.  
2.1515  These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with which 
the picture touches reality.  [5] 
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And, as for the statements following just after the above lines in the Tractatus, the ones about the 
picture having something in common with what it depicts:  clearly, though we do not need to be 
using the same units in the model and what it models, the systems of measurement need to have 
some things in common [we need to be using the same system of measurement between the 
model and the thing modelled (not necessarily the same system of units, but of the same system 
of measurement in a sense that can be made precise)] in order to use this method to construct a 
model that is able to picture what it models.  So, that makes sense too.  ( [Exactly what they must 
have in common is, I think, part of the investigation in the Tractatus.) ] 
 
While I don't want to repeat the arguments in the book here, I would like to point out that the 
analogy I laid out in the book (depicted in Figures 3 and 4) addresses what I think is a common 
worry about what's known as Wittgenstein's "Picture Theory."   The worry, I think, is that just 
knowing that the elements of a picture correspond to elements in reality doesn't yield enough to 
guarantee that the picture will track reality.  "Having the same logical form" just seems too scanty 
a basis to most people, I suspect.  Then, there is the problem with the point that, as Wittgenstein 
says, "The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their 
representatives."  I think people are bound to ask how this is supposed to be guaranteed, too.   
 
I consider some of these worries to be genuine worries about endorsing the picture theory -- at 
least the Picture Theory as it is often understood.  I don't think it is very easy for a reader of the 
Tractatus to understand how the proposition as a picture is supposed to account for what it 
purports to account for in any rigorous way.  In fact, I think Wittgenstein knew others weren't 
going to understand his point, yet, that he felt that what he wrote was correct.  He did, after all, 
write in the preface that, although he wasn't sure he had accomplished the task of expressing the 
thoughts expressed in the book very well, that " the truth of the thoughts that are here 
communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive." ( [5], pgs. 3 - 4 )  I'm going to go with 
that line:  Wittgenstein didn't think anyone would understand the thoughts he tried to express in 
the Tractatus, yet he thought the truth of those thoughts was "unassailable and definitive."    
 
I find that the key to making sense of the thoughts he attempts to express in the statements in the 
Tractatus about objects, states of affairs, and propositions is to recognize that his account draws 
on the existence of quantitative science, i.e.,  the existence of measuring systems and equations 
that express relationships between measured quantities.  It is in the design and standardization of 
systems of measurement --- which, in a coherent system of measurement, include a connection 
to reality, as they require that the units that have different dimensions associated with them be 
'coherently' related to each other, which involves establishing physical relationships; as a result, 
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the relationships between dimensions (kinds of quantities) are  formalized.  Since I see 
dimensions as analogous to objects, this explains many of the otherwise inscrutable claims about 
objects we find in the Tractatus.  
 
Again, the historical and biographical details are supportive of my suggestion.  First, there is the 
context that, in 1914, many physicists and engineers would know what a dimension was, would 
be quite competent in using dimensional equations.  They would consider it quite natural to think 
of combining dimensions, which is done without any arithmetical connectives, and with 
expressing a dimension in terms of combinations of others.  I say this because significant debates 
on the topic of which units should be used in physics were still in very recent memory in 1914; 
and these debates required the language of dimensions.  In fact, Hertz had entered the debate 
with a very philosophical argument; Jed Buchwald discusses it in his book The creation of 
scientific effects  ( [12], Chapter 12 )  In his argument, Hertz uses the notation of dimensions, i.e., 
he writes ML2T2  to indicate the dimensions of the units of work; M, L and T denote respectively 
the dimensions Mass, Length and Time, just as they do on page from the Handout to HOPOS 
2000 talk reproduced in the appendix to this paper.  
 
I think of a dimension as a kind of quantity.  But, and this might have been difficult for even 
scientifically trained commentators and readers of the Tractatus coming upon it after 1930 or so 
to imagine: not only the system of units, but the issue of how many basic units were needed in 
order to be able to do physics, was in flux in the late nineteenth century. There were the basic 
units of mass, length, and time, as in Newton's day, but there was the new question of how to 
handle units for measurements made of quantities regarding electricity and magnetism.  It was 
easy enough to define units of each, in terms of a laboratory procedure involving an electrical or 
magnetic pole.  But, it was impossible to answer:  "Which is more basic:  an electrical pole or a 
magnetic pole?"   Contradictions arose no matter which system of units was preferred; in addition, 
many additional units were added and adopted, without increasing the number of basic units, 
because they were more practical to use.  Some argued that three basic units (mass, length and 
time) were sufficient.  It wasn't until 1901 that the Italian Giovanni Giorgi showed that by adding a 
fourth basic unit, and hence admitting a fourth dimension (a fourth basic kind of quantity) to the 
system of units, that the global physics community could solve the problem in an especially 
desirable way, in that the resulting system of units would not conflict with the use of the practical 
units already used in everyday technological and laboratory work.  In 1914, though, these had not 
yet been adopted formally.  The topic was still live, and so was the language that was then 
considered the language of science:  dimensional analysis.   And, we do see Wittgenstein bring 
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up measurement, as in his statement quoted above, that a proposition is laid against reality like a 
measure.   
 
Secondly, I don't think Wittgenstein says nearly enough to explain what's needed to the reader 
who does not know very much about model experiments, dynamical similarity, and similar 
systems. In his defense, someone writing in 1914, which I have called "The Year of Physically 
Similar Systems" [10], coming on the heels of Onnes' fame, might assume that the whole family 
of similarity concepts had finally won the day in physics and were going to be as common as the 
notion of gravity from now on.  Sadly, the opposite happened and the war seems to have 
disrupted collective memory about them.   
 
Also, the arguments about the basis for measurement in the new physics, and the role of 
measurement standards in physics, had basically been made.  It is true that, in 1914, it would still 
be awhile before the solution Giorgi proposed around 1900/1901 was eventually adopted by the 
international agencies charged with deciding such things -- but the debates that delved into the 
fundamental questions of measurement in electromagnetism, were over.  So, even though there 
would still be active discussion of them in 1914, and the language of dimensional analysis would 
then still be quite common, the occasions for using it in debates in which the question of how 
many different dimensions were needed was a live question were fewer and fewer.  The result is 
that we philosophers are put in a deficient position with respect to understanding comments about 
measurement and modeling unless we are willing to go back and learn what physics was like in 
1914 -- and I don't mean current reconstructions of what was known in 1914 phrased in 
anachronistic terms.   
 
So, I'd like to make a suggestion about understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus, at least the parts 
of it associated with the so-called "Picture Theory":  I suggest that it might help if we as a 
philosophical community get to know the scientific milieu in which the Tractatus was conceived a 
little better, including the language and methods of physics of the day.  Especially, the language 
and methods, including systems of measurement, of the [physics] logic underlying the use of 
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By mid-1914, prior to the point when he locks on to the idea that "In the proposition a world is put 
together experimentally" and "the proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture", 





and, in the pre-war Notes on Logic, he has already recognized relationships between 
propositions, signs, and symbols, as follows (Fig 2a from [1], p. 223) :  
 
 





Then, during the war, after picking up the thoughts above about picturing, and developing them, 
the views I have depicted above in Figures 1A and 2A & B are revised, in a way that builds upon 
them.  In the Tractatus what we see for the two very different-looking gramophone records and 
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The account of propositions in the Tractatus is considerably developed; I depicted it in Figure 4.  
Then, I showed how like the account of experimental models first presented in July 1914 and, 
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(note:  I would say objects are 'kinds of quantities' (length, viscosity) instead of 'quantities" now.)  
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